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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This appeal arises under the Truth in Lending Act 
("TILA"), 15 U.S.C. S 1601 et seq. , and the Electronic Fund 
Transfer Act ("EFTA"), 15 U.S.C. S 1693 et seq. Plaintiff 
Terry Johnson, who entered into a short-term loan 
agreement with County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Delaware 
("Bank"), contends that the terms of the loan violated both 
the TILA and the EFTA. He seeks to bring a class action 
suit against both the Bank and Tele-Cash, Inc., which 
acted as the Bank's agent for the loan transaction. The 
Defendants respond that the dispute belongs in an arbitral 
forum, as the loan agreement signed by Johnson contains 
an arbitration clause. This appeal presents the question, 
one of first impression in the Courts of Appeals, whether 
claims under the TILA and the EFTA can be referred to 
arbitration under an arbitration clause when a plaintiff 
seeks to bring a claim on behalf of multiple claimants. 
 
Johnson submits that compelling arbitration is precluded 
by an "irreconcilable conflict" between the arbitration 
clause and the purposes of the TILA and the EFTA. He 
argues that Congress consciously inserted language into 
the statutes with the intent of encouraging district court 
judges to certify class actions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. He 
further maintains that in the legislative history of 
 
                                3 
  
amendments to the TILA, Congress communicated that 
class action remedies play a central role in the TILA and 
EFTA enforcement schemes. Rather than simply provide 
restitution, Johnson asserts, such litigation is meant to 
serve public policy goals through plaintiffs who act as 
private attorneys general, for the class action device is 
necessary to ensure meaningful deterrence to creditors who 
might violate the acts. 
 
The District Court agreed with Johnson that there was 
an "inherent conflict" between compelling arbitration and 
the TILA and the EFTA and denied the Defendants' motion 
to compel arbitration under the agreement. We will reverse. 
Though there may be some tension between the purposes 
of the debtor-protection statutes and arbitration, we are not 
persuaded that the two are so at odds as to preclude 
arbitration in this context. The Supreme Court has made 
clear that the presumption in favor of arbitration 
established by the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. 
S 1 et seq., is a powerful one. Because neither the TILA nor 
the EFTA explicitly precludes the selection of arbitration 
instead of litigation, a party who agrees to arbitrate, but 
then asserts that his or her statutory claim cannot be 
vindicated in an arbitral forum, faces a heavy burden. That 
burden has not been met here. 
 
As a predicate to this conclusion, we note our belief that 
the public interest purposes behind the civil penalty 
provisions of the statutes are not in conflict with 
arbitration, even if arbitration clauses may prevent the 
bringing of class actions. To the extent that class actions 
serve public interest goals, those goals are also met by 
other provisions of the laws, which allow for enforcement of 
the statutes by federal agencies that possess sufficient 
sanctioning power to provide a meaningful deterrent to 
creditors who violate the terms of either act. Moreover, 
neither act grants potential plaintiffs any substantive right 
that cannot be vindicated in an arbitral forum. While it may 
be true that the benefits of proceeding as a class are 
unavailable in arbitration, neither statute confers upon 
plaintiffs the right to proceed as a class. Instead, the right 
is merely a procedural one, arising under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, 
that may be waived by agreeing to an arbitration clause. In 
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sum, because we can discern no congressional intent to 
preclude the enforcement of arbitration clauses in either 
statute's text, legislative history, or purpose, we hold that 
such clauses are effective even though they may render 
class actions to pursue statutory claims under the TILA or 
the EFTA unavailable. 
 
I. 
 
Johnson applied for and received a short-term loan for 
$250 from the Bank on July 10, 1998. The loan agreement 
disclosed an annual percentage rate of 917%, stemming 
from finance charges of $88 for the two-week loan. Thus, 
under the agreement, Johnson had to repay the loan by 
making one payment of $338 two weeks after receiving his 
$250. The loan agreement also contained the following 
arbitration clause: 
 
       You and we agree that any claim, dispute, or 
       controversy between us . . . and any claim arising from 
       or relating to this Note, no matter by whom or against 
       whom . . . including the validity of this Note and of this 
       agreement to arbitrate disputes as well as claims 
       alleging fraud or misrepresentation shall be resolved by 
       binding arbitration by and under the Code of 
       Procedure of the National Arbitration Forum . . . . This 
       arbitration agreement is made pursuant to a 
       transaction involving interstate commerce and shall be 
       governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. [SS] 
       1-16. 
 
App. 20. The loan agreement further provided: 
 
       NOTICE: YOU AND WE WOULD HAVE HAD A RIGHT 
       OR OPPORTUNITY TO LITIGATE DISPUTES 
       THROUGH A COURT BUT HAVE AGREED INSTEAD 
       TO RESOLVE DISPUTES THROUGH BINDING 
       ARBITRATION. 
 
       By signing and sealing below, you agree to all of the 
       terms of this Note, including the agreement to arbitrate 
       disputes. 
 
Id. at 20. 
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Johnson filed suit on behalf of a putative class in the 
District Court for the District of Delaware, alleging that the 
Bank and Tele-Cash, Inc., the bank's agent for the loan 
transaction, violated both the TILA and the EFTA by failing 
to properly disclose the high rate of interest, and by 
requiring loan applicants to open accounts from which they 
were required to irrevocably preauthorize electronic fund 
transfers to pay the loan. 
 
The Defendants moved to stay the proceedings and 
compel arbitration. Concluding that arbitration was at odds 
with the purposes of the TILA and the EFTA, the District 
Court denied a motion to compel arbitration and stay the 
proceedings or dismiss the case. The District Court did, 
however, dismiss Johnson's claim that the arbitration 
clause was unconscionable. The Defendants timely 
appealed. The District Court had jurisdiction to hear 
Johnson's action under 28 U.S.C. S 1331. Though the 
District Court's refusal to compel arbitration was 
interlocutory, such refusals are immediately appealable 
under the FAA. See 9 U.S.C. S 16(a) ("An appeal may be 
taken from . . . an order . . . refusing a stay of any action 
under section 3 of this title [or] denying a petition under 
section 4 of this title to order arbitration to proceed."). The 
question whether the TILA and the EFTA preclude 
arbitration when the plaintiff seeks to assert claims on 
behalf of a class presents a question of law over which our 
review is plenary. 
 
II. 
 
Whether a court can compel arbitration of TILA claims 
when the parties' loan agreement contains an arbitration 
clause but the plaintiff seeks to bring claims on behalf of 
multiple claimants is a question of first impression for this 
court. No other federal appellate court has squarely 
addressed the issue either. A number of district courts have 
ruled on the subject. Most of these rulings favor the view 
that the TILA does not preclude the pre-dispute selection by 
the parties of an arbitral forum should any controversy 
arise. Compare Thompson v. Illinois Title Loans, Inc., No. 99- 
C-3952, 2000 WL 45493 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 2000); Sagal v. 
First USA Bank, N.A., 69 F. Supp. 2d 627 (D. Del. 1999); 
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Stout v. Byrider, 50 F. Supp. 2d 627 (N.D. Ohio 1999); 
Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 991 F. Supp. 1410 (M.D. 
Ala. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 178 F.3d 1149 (11th Cir. 
1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 1552 (Apr. 3, 2000); Lopez 
v. Plaza Fin. Co., No. 95-C-7567, 1996 WL 210073 (N.D. Ill. 
April 25, 1996); Meyers v. Univest Home Loan, Inc., No. C- 
93-1783 MHP, 1993 WL 307747 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 1993), 
with Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 
1087 (W.D. Mich. 2000). 
 
In general, nothing prevents contracting parties from 
including a provision in their agreements that refers 
statutory claims arising under the contract to arbitration. 
See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 
26 (1991). Arbitration of statutory claims will not be 
precluded absent congressional direction. "Having made the 
bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless 
Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a 
waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue." 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 
U.S. 614, 628 (1985). The burden of establishing that 
Congress meant to preclude arbitration for a statutory 
claim rests with the party who seeks to avoid arbitration. 
See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26. Such intention may be found in 
the text, legislative history, or in an "inherent conflict" 
between arbitration and the statute's underlying purposes. 
Id. (citing Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 
482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987)). "Throughout such an inquiry, it 
should be kept in mind that `questions of arbitrability must 
be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy 
favoring arbitration.' " Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l 
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)). 
 
It is the third category, inherent conflict, on which the 
District Court based its opinion. The Court concluded that 
an inherent conflict existed because "without the possibility 
of class action liability looming on a creditor's horizon, 
there is a very real possibility that these entities will not 
voluntarily comply with the Truth-in-Lending regulations." 
Johnson v. Tele-Cash, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 264, 271 (D. Del. 
1999). We agree that if Johnson is to prevail, it must be on 
the basis of demonstrating an inherent conflict. There is 
nothing in either the text or the legislative history of the 
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TILA to indicate that Congress intended to allow plaintiffs 
to avoid binding arbitration clauses. Both the statute and 
the legislative history, however, offer insight into the 
question whether an "inherent conflict" is to be found 
between the statute and arbitration. 
 
A. Statutory Language 
 
The TILA provides for civil liability for lenders who fail to 
give the disclosures required by the statute. See 15 U.S.C. 
S 1640. An aggrieved party is entitled to recover actual as 
well as statutory damages. Statutory damages can be twice 
the amount of any finance charge, but, for most 
transactions, they may not exceed $1,000 or fall short of 
$100. See id. SS 1640(a)(1), (2). The statute specifically 
addresses the damages available in a class action, limiting 
the maximum potential recovery. Plaintiffs can recover 
 
       in the case of a class action, such amount as the court 
       may allow, except that as to each member of the class 
       no minimum recovery shall be applicable, and the total 
       recovery under this subparagraph in any class action 
       or series of class actions arising out of the same failure 
       to comply by the same creditor shall not be more than 
       the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of the net 
       worth of the creditor. 
 
Id. S 1640(a)(1)(B). The statute further directs that 
 
       [i]n determining the amount of award in any class 
       action, the court shall consider, among other relevant 
       factors, the amount of any actual damages awarded, 
       the frequency and persistence of failures of compliance 
       by the creditor, the resources of the creditor, the 
       number of persons adversely affected, and the extent to 
       which the creditor's failure of compliance was 
       intentional. 
 
Id. S 1640(a). 
 
Though the statute clearly contemplates class actions, 
there are no provisions within the law that create a right to 
bring them, or evince an intent by Congress that claims 
initiated as class actions be exempt from binding 
arbitration clauses. The "right" to proceed to a class action, 
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insofar as the TILA is concerned, is a procedural one that 
arises from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 23. 
 
B. Legislative History 
 
Johnson relies heavily on the legislative history behind 
several amendments to the TILA. After the law wasfirst 
enacted, some courts were reluctant to certify class actions, 
in part due to the concern that large class awards could 
overwhelm lending institutions. See generally Ratner v. 
Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 414 
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (refusing to certify class of TILA plaintiffs 
when "the allowance of thousands of minimum recoveries 
like plaintiff 's would carry to an absurd and stultifying 
extreme the specific and essentially inconsistent remedy 
Congress prescribed as the means of private enforcement"). 
In 1974 Congress responded by enacting the limitations on 
class action recovery discussed above. In so doing, it 
created some legislative history that bespeaks the potential 
role that class actions are meant to play in the enforcement 
of the TILA's substantive requirements. Johnson contends 
that this history demonstrates Congress's intent to preserve 
a statutory class action remedy under the TILA. 
 
Most of the language favorable to Johnson is found in a 
report of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and 
Urban Affairs pertaining to the 1974 amendments. We 
quote from it at length. 
 
        A problem has arisen in applying these minimum 
       liability provisions in class action suits involving 
       millions of consumers. If each member of the class is 
       entitled to a minimum award of $100, a creditor's 
       liability can be enormous. For example, if a large 
       national department store chain with 10 million 
       customers fails to include a required item of 
       information on its monthly billing statement, it can be 
       subject to a minimum liability of $1 billion in a class 
       action suit 
 
       . . . . 
 
        The purpose of the civil penalties section under 
       Truth in Lending was to provide creditors with a 
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       meaningful incentive to comply with the law without 
       relying upon an extensive new bureaucracy. However, 
       the Committee feels this objective can be achieved 
       without subjecting creditors to enormous penalties for 
       violations which do not involve actual damages and 
       may be of a technical nature. Putting a reasonable 
       limit on a creditor's maximum class action liability 
       would seem to be in the best interest of both creditors 
       and consumers. 
 
       . . . . 
 
        . . . . The Committee believes the present ambiguities 
       and uncertainties with respect to class action suits 
       under Truth in Lending should be clarified. Moreover, 
       the Committee agrees with the Federal Reserve Board 
       that "potential class action liability is an important 
       encouragement to the voluntary compliance which is so 
       necessary to insure nationwide adherence to uniform 
       disclosure" and that such remedies should not be 
       restricted to actual damages. As the Committee pointed 
       out in its report on similar legislation last year,"Most 
       Truth in Lending violations do not involve actual 
       damages and . . . some meaningful penalty provisions 
       are therefore needed to insure compliance." 
 
        Accordingly, the Committee again decided to place an 
       aggregate limitation on a creditor's class action liability 
       for violations not involving actual damages. 
 
S. Rep. No. 93-278, at 14-15 (1973). The conference report 
for the final legislation is far less expansive, not discussing 
the purposes of the caps in any great detail, but stating 
that "[t]he limitation on class action suits was further 
limited to the lesser of $100,000 or 1 percent of the net 
worth of the creditor to protect small businessfirms from 
catastrophic judgments." H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1429 
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6148, 6153. 
 
Several years later, the cap on class action awards was 
raised from $100,000 to $500,000. At the time, the Senate 
report, prepared by the Banking, Housing and Urban 
Affairs Committee, noted: 
 
        The chief enforcement tool will continue to be private 
       actions for actual damages and civil penalties. . . . 
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        . . . . The risk of any ceiling on class action recoveries 
       is that, if it is too low, it acts as a positive disincentive 
       to the bringing of such actions and thus frustrates the 
       enforcement policy for which class actions are 
       recognized. . . . 
 
        The Committee wishes to avoid any implication that 
       the ceiling on class action recovery is meant to 
       discourage use of the class action device. The 
       recommended $500,000 limit, coupled with the 1% 
       formula, provides, we believe, a workable structure for 
       private enforcement. Small businesses are protected by 
       the 1% measure, while a potential half million dollar 
       recovery ought to act as a significant deterrent to even 
       the largest creditor. 
 
S. Rep. No. 94-590, at 8 (1976), reprinted in  1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 431, 438. 
 
Though Congress did not address the role of arbitration 
in the legislative history, Johnson urges that the history 
recited above demonstrates the centrality of class actions to 
the TILA's effective enforcement.1 Accordingly, we turn to 
consider whether an arbitration clause that precludes 
bringing a class action suit under the TILA irreconcilably 
conflicts with the statute. 
 
C. Statutory Purposes 
 
Because nothing in the legislative history or the statutory 
text of the TILA clearly expresses congressional intent to 
preclude the ability of parties to engage in arbitration, 
Johnson must demonstrate that arbitration irreconcilably 
conflicts with the purposes of the TILA. While Johnson may 
be correct in arguing that Congress contemplated class 
actions as a part of the TILA enforcement scheme, and even 
that class actions were self-consciously promoted by 
Congress in amending the statute, he falls short of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Insofar as the committee did endorse class actions, it should be noted 
that the endorsement was not unequivocal. The committee said it would 
be considering alternatives to class actions in the future, adding "[w]e 
are hopeful that there may be workable and effective substitutes for the 
class action as a consumer enforcement device . . . ." Id. 
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demonstrating irreconcilable conflict between arbitration 
and the TILA. 
 
1. TILA's public policy goals 
 
Johnson focuses on the ability of a class action award to 
act as a penalty against lenders who violate the TILA. This 
focus is logical. The prospect of a class action award will 
doubtless deter TILA violations more effectively than the 
prospect that debtors will pursue individual actions, either 
in court or in arbitration, because the damages available to 
individuals are generally limited. See 15 U.S.C. S 1640. In 
this manner, argues Johnson, class actions are central to 
TILA's purposes, because the statute's civil damages 
provisions are not remedial, but rather, given the frequent 
absence of actual damages, are designed to deter  unfair 
credit practices. Phrased another way, the TILA, in 
Johnson's submission, is meant to encourage private 
attorneys general, and the statute as a whole is intended 
for public purposes rather than private grievances. While 
these arguments carry force, they are ultimately 
unpersuasive, for they do not translate into a conclusion 
that class actions are necessary to provide deterrence or 
fulfill any of the other goals of the Act. 
 
a. The effects of arbitration on private litigation 
 
First, even if plaintiffs who sign valid arbitration 
agreements lack the procedural right to proceed as part of 
a class, they retain the full range of rights created by the 
TILA. These rights remain available in individual arbitration 
proceedings. The Supreme Court has made clear that when 
arbitration will preserve a plaintiff 's substantive rights, 
compelling arbitration in accordance with an arbitration 
clause will not impede a statute's deterrent function. "[S]o 
long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his 
or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the 
statute will continue to serve both its remedial and 
deterrent function." Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985). Johnson 
does not argue that the arbitral forum selected in his 
agreement is somehow inadequate to vindicate any of his 
rights under the TILA or that arbitrators would be unable 
to afford him any relief that he could individually obtain in 
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a court proceeding, including injunctive relief or attorney's 
fees. Cf. Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 178 F.3d 1149, 
1158 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 1552 (Apr. 
3, 2000) (reversing order compelling arbitration in a TILA 
case because the clause at issue "raises serious concerns 
with respect to filing fees, arbitrators' costs and other 
arbitration expenses that may curtail or bar a plaintiff 's 
access to the arbitral forum"); Baron v. Best Buy Co., Inc., 
75 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1370 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (appeal 
pending) (refusing to compel arbitration in a TILA case 
when arbitration agreement required parties to bear own 
expense for attorneys' costs in contravention of TILA 
provisions that provide for recovery of attorneys' fees). 
 
Under the prevailing jurisprudence, when the right made 
available by a statute is capable of vindication in the 
arbitral forum, the public policy goals of that statute do not 
justify refusing to arbitrate. The notion that there is a 
meaningful distinction between vindicating a statute's 
social purposes and adjudicating private grievances for 
purposes of determining whether a statute precludes 
compelling arbitration under a valid arbitration clause was 
rejected by the Supreme Court in Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). That 
case concerned whether claims under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") must be 
available in a judicial forum. The Court concluded 
otherwise, despite arguments based on the ADEA's 
important social policy goals. "As Gilmer contends, the 
ADEA is designed not only to address individual grievances, 
but also to further important social policies. We do not 
perceive any inherent inconsistency between those policies, 
however, and enforcing agreements to arbitrate age 
discrimination claims." Id. at 27 (citation omitted). Class 
actions could be similarly effective in promoting the ADEA's 
social policies, and, as discussed below, that statute lends 
itself more easily to being construed as creating a 
substantive right to a class action. Gilmer therefore appears 
to foreclose much of Johnson's argument. 
 
We also note that while arbitrating claims that might 
have been pursued as part of class actions potentially 
reduces the number of plaintiffs seeking to enforce the TILA 
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against creditors, arbitration does not eliminate plaintiff 
incentives to assert rights under the Act. The sums 
available in recovery to individual plaintiffs are not 
automatically increased by use of the class forum. Indeed, 
individual plaintiff recoveries available in a class action 
may be lower than those possible in individual suits 
because the recovery available under TILA's statutory cap 
on class recoveries is spread over the entire class. Nor will 
arbitration necessarily choke off the supply of lawyers 
willing to pursue claims on behalf of debtors. Attorneys' 
fees are recoverable under the TILA, see 15 U.S.C. 
S 1640(a)(3), and would therefore appear to be recoverable 
in arbitration, as arbitrators possess the power to fashion 
the same relief as courts.2 In sum, though pursuing 
individual claims in arbitration may well be less attractive 
than pursuing a class action in the courts, we do not agree 
that compelling arbitration of the claim of a prospective 
class action plaintiff irreconcilably conflicts with TILA's goal 
of encouraging private actions to deter violations of the Act. 
Whatever the benefits of class actions, the FAA"requires 
piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an 
arbitration agreement." Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. 
Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 20 (1985) (emphasis in the 
original). 
 
b. The availability of administrative enforcement 
       mechanisms 
 
Our conclusion that there is no irreconcilable conflict 
between the TILA's social policy goals and arbitration of 
claims that could have been heard as part of a class action 
is bolstered by the statute's administrative enforcement 
provisions. These provisions offer meaningful deterrents to 
violators of the TILA if private enforcement actions should 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. There does not appear to be a problem with securing the full range of 
remedies available under the TILA in this case because Rule 20(d) of the 
National Arbitration Forum, the arbitrators selected in the parties' 
contract, currently authorizes arbitrators to "grant any remedy or relief 
allowed by applicable substantive law and based on a Claim, Response, 
or Request properly submitted by a Party under this Code." Of course if 
the arbitral rules in question precluded the substantive relief made 
available by the statute, or the forum otherwise presented barriers to a 
plaintiff 's assertion of his or her rights, we would have a different 
case. 
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fail to fulfill that role. The statute gives general enforcement 
power to the Federal Trade Commission as the "overall 
enforcing agency," and permits it to employ its powers 
under the Federal Trade Commission Act, see 15 U.S.C. 
S 1607(c), such as the issuing of cease and desist orders, 
see 15 U.S.C. S 45. The TILA also grants enforcement 
authority to the variety of federal agencies that have 
jurisdiction over various lending institutions, including the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal 
Reserve Board, and the FDIC. See 15 U.S.C.S 1607(a). In 
addition to allowing these federal agencies to order the 
adjustment of inaccurately disclosed finance charges, see 
id. S 1607(e), the TILA cross references section 8 of the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. S 1818, to set 
forth other enforcement powers, see 15 U.S.C. S 1607(a). 
Therefore the agencies may, for example, impose monetary 
penalties of up to $5,000 per day (or of $25,000 per day if 
the violations are part of a pattern of misconduct), see 12 
U.S.C. S 1818(i), or in some instances order the suspension 
and removal of institution directors or officers, see 12 
U.S.C. S 1818(e). 
 
Johnson responds by invoking the portion of the 
legislative history that speaks to the need to avoid"relying 
upon an extensive new bureaucracy." S. Rep. No. 93-278, 
at 14 (1973). This reference is of limited usefulness, for this 
snippet of legislative history does not indicate congressional 
intent that arbitration be precluded, or that individual 
actions are inadequate to serve the function of deterring 
violations of the TILA. It may be true that Congress saw 
value in maintaining the availability of class actions, but 
that does not translate to the conclusion that it intended to 
preclude private parties from contracting around their 
availability. Under the framework established by the 
Supreme Court, legislative history may be used to 
demonstrate congressional intent to preclude arbitration. 
See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 
26 (1991). When that history is used, as here, merely to 
demonstrate that the judicial remedies provided for or 
contemplated by a statute are important, it is of noticeably 
reduced value. The importance of statutory judicial 
remedies are always evident from their mere existence-- 
Congress obviously enacted them for a reason. Were they 
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not the object of a congressional goal, they would not have 
been enacted. It is therefore hard to see how the legislative 
history relied upon by Johnson could possibly be dispositive.3 
 
Insofar as Congress's intent, broadly contemplated, is 
concerned, we must give equal consideration to Congress's 
policy goals in enacting the FAA. The statute was intended 
to overcome judicial hostility to agreements to arbitrate, see 
Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-21 & 
n.6 (1985), and it reflects "a liberal federal policy favoring 
arbitration agreements," see Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. 
Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). See also H.R. 
Rep. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924) ("Arbitration agreements are 
purely matters of contract, and the effect of this bill is 
simply to make the contracting party live up to his 
agreement."). Indeed, a Senate Judiciary Committee Report 
supporting the legislation explained that arbitration 
provides benefits to both consumers and businesses in 
speed and lower costs. "The desire to avoid the delay and 
expense of litigation persists. The desire grows with time 
and as delays and expense increase. The settlement of 
disputes by arbitration appeals to big business and little 
business alike, to corporate interests as well as to 
individuals." S. Rep. No. 68-536, at 3 (1924). 
 
Similarly, the committee found that there was general 
satisfaction among participants with arbitration. See id. A 
1982 House of Representatives report reached similar 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Moreover, even if legislative history were dispositive, there is 
similar 
history accompanying the original version of the TILA that indicates the 
importance of administrative enforcement in securing the rights of most 
consumers. The House Report, prepared by the Committee on Banking 
and Currency, explained that enforcement on the administrative level 
was essential to the legislative purpose of the Act. See H.R. Rep. No. 90- 
1040 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1962, 1975. "For the 
relatively unsophisticated consumer, particularly those of modest means, 
administrative enforcement will provide their only protection against 
unscrupulous merchants or lenders." Id. The report also characterizes 
the civil remedies as secondary to the administrative ones. "While 
primary enforcement of the bill would be accomplished under the 
administrative enforcement section discussed above, further provision is 
made for the institution of civil action by an aggrieved debtor." Id. at 
1976. 
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conclusions, stating that "[t]he advantages of arbitration are 
many: it is usually cheaper and faster than litigation; it can 
have simpler procedural and evidentiary rules; it normally 
minimizes hostility and is less disruptive of ongoing and 
future business dealings among the parties; [and] it is often 
more flexible in regard to scheduling . . . ." H.R. Rep. No. 
97-542, at 13 (1982). These benefits have been similarly 
recognized by the Supreme Court as being part of 
Congress's intent in passing the FAA. See Allied-Bruce 
Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995) (citing the 
1924 Senate Report and the 1982 House Report). We 
therefore cannot consider the legislative history relied upon 
by Johnson without giving equal heed to the clear 
congressional policy behind the FAA. 
 
In short, Johnson's reliance on the legislative history 
summarized in Part II.B is fundamentally flawed. He uses 
it not to show that Congress intended that parties could 
avoid a valid arbitration clauses if they wished to litigate a 
TILA claim, but rather, and in a more attenuated manner, 
to show that class actions have important purposes under 
the statute. But nothing in the cited passages demonstrates 
that parties cannot choose to waive judicial remedies in 
favor of arbitration. In any case, the loss of the availability 
of a class action does not mean the loss of meaningful 
deterrence to TILA violations, insofar as the public remedies 
discussed above remain. It may be true that the 
unavailability of class actions removes an incentive for 
lenders to comply with the statute, but it is far from the 
only incentive to do so. 
 
We similarly do not view the fact that Congress seems to 
have self-consciously encouraged class actions as 
particularly telling. In acting to ease the certification of 
classes, see supra Part II.B, Congress did nothing to 
preserve the right to a class action over arbitration or 
preclude opting for arbitration. Rather, it only altered the 
factors that judges consider in determining whether to 
allow the procedural right of a class action to be exercised. 
Notably, Congress did not add language compelling judges 
to recognize prospective classes under any circumstances. 
One can therefore look at the 1974 and 1976 amendments 
as efforts by Congress to place class actions on the same 
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footing as any other lawsuit, no more or less subject to 
arbitration than a cause of action arising under any other 
statute. 
 
2. Substantive Rights 
 
Johnson also argues that the TILA does effectively create 
an unwaivable right to bring a class action. The strongest 
statement of this argument is as follows. Congress enacted 
a scheme in which the court hearing a class action could 
set a damage figure up to a certain amount for certain 
patterns of conduct. This judicial flexibility in imposing 
damages up to $500,000 only exists if a class action is 
allowed, as individual plaintiff claims are generally capped 
at $1,000. Therefore, a right of classes to a judicially 
crafted punitive remedy is lost if this court orders 
arbitration of Johnson's claims. Similarly, if class actions 
are precluded, arbitrators acting in lieu of courts would not 
have a basis for considering, in connection with a class 
remedy, the frequency and persistence of compliance 
failures by the creditors, the number of persons adversely 
affected, or the creditors' intent. See 15 U.S.C. S 1640(a).4 
 
This argument is unavailing in light of Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). The 
ADEA, at issue in Gilmer, presented far more powerful 
textual support than the TILA for concluding that there is 
a right to proceed collectively despite the existence of an 
arbitration clause. The ADEA actually provides for collective 
litigation. See 29 U.S.C. S 626(b) (referencing the remedies 
in 29 U.S.C. S 216). "An action . . . may be maintained 
against any employer (including a public agency) in any 
Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. This court has never addressed the question whether class actions can 
be pursued in arbitral forums, though it appears impossible to do so 
unless the arbitration agreement contemplates such a procedure. See 
Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 274-75 (7th Cir. 1995). At 
oral argument, the parties indicated that the rules of the National 
Arbitration Forum, which govern the arbitration agreement here, 
preclude the joinder of actions unless all parties affirmatively consent. 
We therefore assume, for purposes of this appeal, that Johnson's effort 
to pursue his claims as a representative of a class would be precluded 
by enforcement of the arbitration clause. 
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or more employees for and in behalf of himself or 
themselves and other employees similarly situated." 29 
U.S.C. S 216(b) (emphasis added). In short, the statute 
creates a right to sue collectively, which is not similarly 
created by the TILA. Yet the Supreme Court still ruled that 
the ADEA did not preclude arbitration notwithstanding the 
unavailability of the class action remedy there (and also 
notwithstanding all of the public interests vindicated by the 
statute as discussed above in Part II.C.1). See Gilmer, 500 
U.S. at 32. 
 
Johnson argues that Gilmer is taken out of context vis-a- 
vis the provision for class actions because the Supreme 
Court noted that the EEOC, in enforcing the ADEA, could 
still seek class-wide relief, while the FTC is not similarly 
capable. We do not believe that this argument carries any 
force. As discussed above, powerful punitive enforcement 
mechanisms remain available to administrative bodies 
under the Act even if these tools are not in the form of class 
actions. 
 
Furthermore, simply because judicial remedies are a part 
of a law does not mean that Congress meant to preclude 
parties from bargaining around their availability. This is 
manifest in the Supreme Court's treatment of the 
availability of class actions in Gilmer."But `even if the 
arbitration could not go forward as a class action or class 
relief could not be granted by the arbitrator, the fact that 
the [ADEA] provides for the possibility of bringing a 
collective action does not mean that individual attempts at 
conciliation were intended to be barred.' " Gilmer, 500 U.S. 
at 32 (quoting Nicholson v. CPC Int'l Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 241 
(3d Cir. 1989) (Becker, J., dissenting)) (alteration in the 
original). The same holds true for the TILA. Even if we were 
to conclude that the statute implies a right to proceed as a 
member of a class, Gilmer indicates that rights of this 
nature are waivable so long as the rights the statute was 
designed to protect may be vindicated by other means. We 
do not think this unfair. Only those who consent to credit 
agreements with binding arbitration clauses are forced to 
abandon this procedural avenue; those who do not consent 
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to arbitration in their contracts have the full selection of 
forums.5 
 
In sum, Johnson's arguments that the TILA precludes 
arbitration are unpersuasive. "[I]f Congress intended the 
substantive protection afforded by a given statute to 
include protection against waiver of the right to a judicial 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Of course even when arbitration clauses are included in agreements, 
they may be set aside if they are fraudulently induced or are in some 
way unconscionable. As noted above, Johnson did allege that his 
arbitration clause was unconscionable, but the District Court found no 
basis for the conclusion that the clause was in any way oppressive, in 
large part because the clause did not create an arbitration procedure 
that favors one party over another. See Johnson v. Tele-Cash, Inc., 82 F. 
Supp. 2d 264, 279 (D. Del. 1999). Though Johnson complains on appeal 
that the arbitration clause was a contract of adhesion, he does not make 
any argument to contradict the District Court's conclusion that the 
arbitration clause is not unconscionable. 
 
Johnson also claims that waiver of judicial remedies through a 
contract of adhesion violates the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"), 
which prohibits discrimination against any credit applicant who 
exercised a right created under the chapter of the U.S. Code that 
includes the TILA. See 15 U.S.C. S 1691. But Johnson does not properly 
allege that there has been any discrimination, or that he exercised any 
right under any act. Johnson's purported authority for the proposition 
that the ECOA is applicable is Owens v. Magee Fin. Serv., 476 F. Supp. 
758 (E.D. La. 1979), and Bryson v. Bank of New York, 584 F. Supp. 
1306 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). Both cases, however, presented strikingly different 
facts from those at issue here, as they involved oppressive conduct 
against individuals who actively sought to assert rights under the TILA. 
In Owens, a creditor defendant, already being sued for a TILA violation 
by the debtor, made additional credit contingent on the debtor's signing 
a settlement document of her active lawsuit. See Owens, 476 F. Supp. 
at 768. Bryson involved a denial of a loan application simply because an 
applicant inquired about the ability to obtain a loan without taking 
credit insurance. This was a violation because TILA provides consumers 
with the right to refuse to purchase such insurance unless the premium 
is included in the statement of the finance charge of the loan. See 
Bryson, 584 F. Supp. at 1318. 
 
These differences aside, Johnson plainly cannot claim that Defendants' 
conduct violated the ECOA or its implementing regulation because, as 
we discuss in the text, we hold today that the arbitration clause 
contained in the loan agreement did not serve to deprive Johnson of any 
rights held under the TILA. 
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forum, that intention will be deducible from text or 
legislative history." Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985). No such 
intent is deducible here. 
 
III. 
 
The District Court further held that compelling 
arbitration of claims arising under the EFTA irreconcilably 
conflicts with that statute as well. This ruling was based on 
the fact that the EFTA contains limitations on class action 
recovery that mirror those contained in the TILA. Compare 
15 U.S.C. S 1640(a), with 15 U.S.C.S 1693m(a). The District 
Court inferred that Congress's use of identical language 
bespoke identical goals, and that Congress was seeking to 
encourage the certification of class actions under the EFTA 
as it had under the TILA. Because the Court had concluded 
that this goal created an inherent conflict with arbitration 
in the TILA context, it followed that the same conflict was 
manifest when EFTA claims were arbitrated. See Johnson v. 
Tele-Cash, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 264, 272 (D. Del. 1999). 
While we agree that resolution of the arbitration issue with 
respect to TILA claims would also apply to the EFTA, our 
disagreement with the District Court about whether the 
TILA precludes compelling arbitration commands a 
similarly contrary conclusion about the EFTA issue. The 
EFTA's class action language was drafted in 1978, after the 
identical language was placed in the TILA by the 1974 and 
1976 amendments. See Electronic Fund Transfer Act, Pub. 
L. No. 95-630, S 915, 92 Stat. 3737 (1978) (codified at 15 
U.S.C. S 1693m(a)). We do not believe that Congress would 
have different intended meanings for identical statutory 
language contained in similar statutes. Because there is no 
irreconcilable conflict between arbitration and the goals of 
the TILA, we similarly hold that claims arising under the 
EFTA may also be subject to arbitration notwithstanding 
the desire of a plaintiff who previously consented to 
arbitration to bring his or her claims as part of a class. 
 
The order of the District Court denying the motion to stay 
proceedings and compel arbitration will be reversed and the 
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case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
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